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A rent strike, if taken seriously by 
its proponents and not used solely to 
attract the attention of sympathetic 
politicos, can be an extremely 
powerful weapon. It is a strategy of 
economic pressure, forcing landlords 
to accede to specific demands through 
the only language they understand: 
the loss of profits and the inability to 
meet financial commitments. Since 
January, 1969, tenants in Ann Arbor, 
Michigan, have, through the Ann Arbor 
Tenants Union, been conducting a rent 
strike against several major private 
property owners and managers. The 
strike is one of the largest ever 
organized in the United States-at one 
point last spring, 1200 strikers had 
paid more than $140,000 into an 
escrow fund. The role that law played 
in the strike is one of the important, 
and perhaps unique, contributions that 
the Ann Arbor experience has made io 
the fast-growing tenants' rights 
movement and to other major social 
reform movements as well. My 
purpose here is to explore that role. 
In the last ten years, there have 
been successful strikes both in public 
and private housing. The most 
spectacular of these was the 1969 St. 
Louis public housing rent strike, which 
lasted ten months and led to major 
advances in public housing. Innovative 
policies that grew out of the St. Louis 
strike include an upper limit of 25 
percent of a tenant's income for rent, 
creation of a Tenant Affairs Board, 
membership of two tenants on the city 
housing authority, and, most 
important, eventual administration of 
housing projects by tenant-controlled 
management corporations. 
In Detroit, a rent strike against 
private slumlords led to the formation 
of the United Tenants for Collective 
Action. In Washington, D. C., more 
than $40,000 has been withheld in a 
rent strike at the Trenton Terrace 
Apartments. The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia 
has ruled that the fund is legally 
invulnerable until the landlord 
successfully sues the individual 
tenants. Other important examples of 
use of the rent strike strategy include 
the 1968 Detroit public housing strike 
and the Harlem strikes of 1963 and 
1964. 
The impetus for the Ann Arbor 
strike grew out of the nature of the 
housing market in Ann Arbor, which is 
an exaggerated, but not qualitatively 
different, form of the housing 
situation in other parts of the country. 
The combination of rapidly rising 
university enrollment, the high cost of 
financing construction, tight money, 
and collusion among landlords has 
created a landlord's market to such a 
degree that, according to the current 
director of the Office of Student 
Housing at the University of Michigan, 
Ann Arbor may face an absolute 
housing shortage by September, 1970. 
These conditions have led to 
spectacularly high rents (four-man 
apartments average over $310.00 per 
month; average rent for all apartments 
is $87 .SO per person per month for an 
eight-month lease), poor maintenance, 
required payment of three or four 
months' rent in advance, failure by 
landlords to return damage deposits 
and commuting by both university and 
non-university employees who cannot 
afford to rent in Ann Arbor. The 
demands of the strike, therefore, have 
fallen into two categories: (1) landlord 
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recognition of the Ann Arbor Tenants 
Union (AATU), and (2) massive 
housing construction by the University 
of Michigan. Recognition of the 
AATU would give the organization 
greater legitimacy, making it a more 
effective agent in dealing with 
landlords, especially on short-term 
problems like lease conditions, 
maintenance, etc. University 
commitment to a large-scale housing 
program is essential because without 
such direct intervention in the housing 
supply, existing capitalist mechanisms 
will continue to keep the market tight 
and maintain present conditions. In 
addition to demanding that the 
University fund such housing, the 
AATU has demanded that all aspects 
of the housing program be controlled 
by tenants and that the housing be 
open to persons who are not students. 
I. The Law as a Tactic 
Until the major demands of a rent 
strike are met, or until the evolution 
of the movement and the response of 
its opponents necessitate a new 
strategy, the law can be used both to 
protect the strikers and to educate 
them. 
A. Defensive Action 
Collective action by tenants should 
employ tactics that help keep strikers 
from being thrown out of their 
apartments while also serving the 
strategic goal of putting economic 
pressure on landlords. Where, as in 
Ann Arbor, there is a suitable 
statutory framework, the law can 
provide substantial support for these 
tactics. 
In 1968, the Michigan state 
legislature passed five statutes dealing 
with tenants' rights and housing code 
enforcement. Two of these concern 
public housing and are not directly 
relevant to the Ann Arbor experience, 
where all struck housing is privately 
owned. The three other laws (Michigan 
Public Acts 295, 286 and 297, 
respectively) are directly concerned 
with private housing. M.P.A. 295 
provides that in any rental of 
residential premises a landlord 
implicitly covenants that the rental 
property is in fit repair when the 
tenant moves in and that the landlord 
will maintain it in reasonable repair. 
M.P.A. 286 establishes a new and 
stricter housing code enforcement 
procedure. M.P.A. 297, which has 
proved to be the crucial statute for the 
rent strike, gives tenants greater 
protection from eviction. It provides, 
first, that a tenant may raise code 
violations or breaches of the lease as a 
legitimate defense for not paying rent. 
Second, it provides protection against 
retaliatory eviction when a tenant 
attempts to exercise his legal rights 
against the landlord. Finally, it 
provides that the bond required to be 
posted for an appeal of an eviction 
must be "reasonable." (A bond equal 
to nine months' rent was formerly 
required.) At the time of their passage, 
these laws appeared to be a major step 
forward for tenants because they dealt 
with several of the most obnoxious of 
the relevant common law doctrines 
(e.g., the rule that the obligation to 
pay rent is independent of any 
obligation the landlord might have to 
maintain the premises). In reality, 
however, they have not significantly 
changed things. When legal action is 
initiated by the landlord, it is rarely 
carried beyond the initial stages of the 
legal process. In most cases the 
landlord is granted a summary 
judgment against the tenant because 
the tenant fails to appear in court. 
This happens because, as is so often 
the case, the tenant cannot afford a 
lawyer or does not understand his 
rights. When the tenant initiates legal 
action, by suing the landlord, as 
frequently happens, the landlord has 
the distinct advantage of being the 
defendant. He can use legal technical-
ities to delay judgment so that the 
tenant, because of rapidly accumulat-
ing legal costs, has to drop the suit. 
For these reasons, the basic legal 
strategy chosen in Ann Arbor was a 
defensive one. Once tenants were 
educated as to their rights and could 
be provided with adequate legal 
representation through funds collected 
by the AATU, the strike could begin. 
Tenants began withholding their rent 
to exert economic pressure on the 
landlord. In retaliation, the landlord 
was forced to sue the tenant. Armed 
with knowledge of his rights and with 
legal representation, the tenant then 
replaced the landlord as defendant and 
was able to use all the dilatory tactics 
once considered the landlord's sole 
prerogative. 
In a massive rent strike, of course, 
the effect of a single eviction case is 
multiplied many times. The court 
dockets become so jammed that the 
number of judgments reached over any 
reasonable period of time (whether in 
the landlord's or the tenant's favor) 
affects only a tiny fraction of the total 
number of strikers. Maximum 
economic pressure is exerted against 
the property owners, while the strikers 
remain in occupation of their 
apartments. The following facts 
provide evidence that this simple 
strategy has worked well in Ann 
Arbor: (1) during the first four 
months of the strike, fewer than five 
per cent of the strikers had been 
through the courts; (2) during the fall 
of 1969, when the strike was renewed 
after a summer lull, the same pattern 
developed, again creating a huge 
backlog of cases, and (3) municipal 
court dockets are still filled and will 
probably remain so for several months, 
even though recent court decisions 
have taken much of the sting out of 
the strike strategy. In cases already 
litigated (nearly all of which were 
before juries) tenants have received 
rent reductions of up to 70 per cent of 
the back rent. Furthermore, if a tenant 
pays what the court has decided he 
owes within ten days after a judgment 
is reached, he cannot be evicted. The 
tenants, in short, have been able to 
strike with virtual impunity. 
Members of the AATU expected 
from the outset, of course, that 
neither the landlords nor the courts 
would maintain their initial approach 
to dealing with tenants, particularly as 
the effects of the strike became more 
telling. These expectations began to be 
confirmed as early as two months after 
the strike began. The most recent 
action of landlords and courts have 
forced the AATU to consider the rent 
strike as only a secondary strategy in 
building the tenants' movement. 
Discussion of the situation will be 
deferred until the final remarks of the 
paper. 
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B. Affirmative Action 
The tactic outlined above is 
designed to force landlords to take the 
initiative. In addition, the AATU will 
take affirmative action if the resources 
are available and circumstances merit. 
In Ann Arbor, there have been three 
such situations. 
The first was obtaining the 
disqualification of two judges who had 
clear conflicts of interest in landlord-
tenant cases. The most immediate 
effect of these disqualifications was to 
channel all eviction cases to the single 
remaining judge in Ann Arbor. This 
further slowed the litigation process. 
The second situation was an 
anti-trust suit initiated by the AATU 
in the form of a class action. Tenants 
representing this class have charged 
that certain landlords in Ann Arbor 
are in violation of the Sherman and 
Clayton Acts. If successfully 
prosecuted, the suit will cost the 
landlords a substantial amount of 
money in damages. 
The third was the initiation of 
criminal charges against certain 
landlords who had been harrassing 
tenants in ways ranging from mild 
verbal threats to physical assault. The 
most immediate effect of the charges 
was to deter the extra-legal tactics of 
the landlords and to increase the 
confidence and security of the tenants. 
The major problem with affirmative 
action is that it is often expensive, 
time-consuming and unlikely to have 
immediate legal implications. These 
actions, however, produced major side 
benefits of an essentially non-legal 
character. Their most important 
long-term benefit was to educate 
tenants about the housing market and 
the law. The anti-trust suit, which 
charged collusion among landlords to 
fix prices, supplemented and 
highlighted the AA TU campaign 
against outrageously high rents and 
helped to confirm in the tenant's own 
mind his feeling of victimization at the 
hands of the landlords. The disqualifi-
cation of the judges for conflicts of 
interest showed tenants that decisions 
on landlord-tenant cases were not 
made in an impartial vacuum but 
rather in the context of a bias in favor 
of property owners. This gave further 
support to AATU claims that the 
housing market problem in Ann Arbor 
is exacerbated by myriad interwoven 
interests among landlords, bankers, 
judges and local politicians. 
In general, the whole range of legal 
activities related to the strike, 
including the eviction cases them-
selves, has played an important role in 
removing a cloak of myth from the 
law. These activities have reduced the 
tenant's feeling of helplessness when 
he is confronted by strange-looking 
documents, such as notices-to-quit and 
summonses, and have reassured him 
when the landlord threatens to ruin his 
credit rating or prevent him from 
renting anywhere in the city. Legal 
activities have increased the tenant's 
confidence in asserting his right to 
decent housing conditions and have 
helped to make him more militant in 
the face of a legal system that has 
represented the interests of property 
rather than people. 
II. The Operation of the Legal 
Defense Group 
A rent strike legal defense team is 
responsible for all legal research, legal 
defense in eviction cases, the taking of 
affirmative action, and other legal 
problems such as possible injunctions 
and conspiracy and damage suits 
against tenants. In Ann Arbor, a law 
student on the steering committee of 
the rent strike has coordinated the 
work of the legal defense group. He 
gathered together a large team of law 
students, lawyers and others (all 
except the lawyers were volunteers) to 
do the required work. Where legal 
expertise was necessary outside the 
courtroom (for example, in doing 
research), law students themselves 
seemed best qualified, although several 
"laymen" participated as well. The 
actual paperwork involved in preparing 
legal answers for eviction cases was 
also done by non-lawyers; all that was 
required was a very brief training 
period. The coordinator, therefore, 
had little trouble assembling a team 
that was able to accomplish all legal 
tasks except actual appearances in 
court. This was important because the 
lawyers' paid time could be reduced to 
making necessary court appearances. 
In addition, the participation of 
individuals who were neither law 
students nor lawyers emphasized that 
the law does not belong exclusively to 
the formally initiated. 
Although legal defense plays an 
important role throughout the 
duration of the strike, it is most 
important when landlords begin to 
carry out the eviction process against 
tenants. In dealing with the problem 
of summonses served on tenants, the 
legal defense team must not expect 
that these summonses will be served at 
a moderate and constant rate. In Ann 
Arbor, the landlords served all the 
summonses at once, both because it 
was easier for them to proceed in this 
way and because they knew it would 
place a great strain on the legal staff of 
the rent strike. In addition, landlords 
know that there will be a mass exodus 
of students at the end of the academic 
year. Since a person cannot ordinarily 
have a money judgment assessed 
against him unless the court has 
obtained personal jurisdiction, the 
landlords will try to serve the 
summonses to strikers before they 
leave. For these reasons, the legal team 
must be fully prepared in anticipation 
of intensive periods of interviewing 
strikers in order to prepare defenses 
and to write legal answers. This can be 
done only by having large numbers of 
people on call at all times. In the Ann 
Arbor situation, the AATU ran into 
difficulties, particularly at the end of 
the academic year, because they were 
not fully prepared to handle the 
onslaught. 
Most of the basic research should 
be done before the strike begins. 
However, as noted earlier, many 
problems occur because of attempts 
by the landlords and the courts to 
speed up the litigation. Continuing 
research, often on very short notice, is 
necessary to prevent any precedents 
that might ease the backlog of cases. 
A few words must be said about the 
process of hiring lawyers. The most 
important criteria should be: (1) the 
lawyer's record of dependability; (2) 
his readiness to state at the outset 
precisely what he is capable of doing 
and at what price; (3) whether he is 
willing to make a commitment, once 
he has decided to work for the strike, 
to see it through to the end, and; (4) 
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whether he is willing and eager to 
consult with the group he represents 
regarding any tactical decisions. The 
failure of the group and the lawyer to 
reach an understanding on these issues 
created serious problems in Ann 
Arbor. The first lawyer of the AATU, 
who had a reputation for being 
knowledgeable in landlord-tenant law, 
failed to satisfy these criteria. In fact, 
at a very crucial point in the strike he 
withdrew his services completely. By 
that time, the AATU had paid his firm 
$5,000, which exhausted all the 
money in its strike fund that could be 
allocated for attorney's fees. The 
tenants managed to survive during the 
critical interim period after his 
departure by finding several lawyers 
willing to donate their time on a 
temporary basis. They have since been 
able to hire several dependable and 
competent young lawyers to handle 
the eviction cases, and two other 
well-known lawyers to handle the 
conspiracy suit. This experience was 
the hard way to learn a very simple 
lesson-that prospective lawyers must 
be thoroughly probed about how far 
their commitment extends before any 
strike action begins. 
III. Final Remarks 
It was emphasized at the beginning 
of this article that the law should be 
considered one of several possible 
tactics that can be used to aid the 
more fundamental economic struggle 
of the rent strike. Three final points 
will be made to clarify and expand on 
this idea. 
The first is that under some 
circumstances the law will be of no 
advantage whatsoever. In many areas 
of the country, where the common 
law is the only guideline and where 
property interests are firmly en-
trenched, tenants will not be able to 
remain in their apartments legally very 
long after beginning a strike. This, 
however, does not mean that a rent 
strike is not possible. If the tenants are 
already well organized or can be 
organized easily, are militant and can 
gain the support of a significant 
minority of the community, they may 
still be able to strike because the local 
authorities or the landlords may not 
want the confrontation that is likely 
to occur when the tenants are removed 
by force from their apartments. If the 
law is unfavorable and the tenants 
themselves are not prepared to 
undergo substantial risks, then a rent 
strike will not be appropriate. Perhaps 
emphasis on the building of the tenant 
organization (more difficult under 
these circumstances), accompanied by 
milder forms of protest, may be all 
that is possible. In any case, lawyers 
for a nascent tenant movement must 
be prepared for the possibility that 
their role will be negligible. 
The second point, alluded to above, 
is that even after a rent strike is 
underway, both the landlords and the 
courts are certain to adopt tactics 
designed to defeat the purpose of the 
strike strategy. The experiences of 
Ann Arbor are most revealing in this 
respect. The responses of the landlords 
and the courts to the strike were as 
follows: 
I. April, 1969-landlords brought a 
conspiracy suit against 91 striking 
tenants, including most members of 
the original AATU steering committee. 
They failed to obtain a preliminary 
injunction against the strike both 
because of an astute response by 
AATU lawyers and because of 
extra-legal factors, which will be 
considered below. The AATU 
responded by filing a counterclaim and 
successfully requesting extensive 
discovery, thus placing a considerable 
burden on the landlords. For these 
reasons, the landlords will probably 
drop the suit before it goes to trial 
sometime in the spring of this year. 
2. June, 1969-Lawyers for the 
landlords, aided by an ambiguous law 
and a cooperative judge, learned how 
to request court costs more effective-
ly. As a result, court costs have been 
steadily rising against tenants. 
3. December, 1969-Localjudges 
adopted a new court rule ordering that 
all back rents that a landlord claims 
are owed him be deposited into a 
court-controlled escrow fund. If 
tenants fail to do this, summary 
judgments will be issued against 
them. Previously, tenants paid their 
rent to the AATU escrow fund. The 
effect of the new rule has been to 
cripple tenant control over escrow 
money. (The courts have been unable 
to attach the AATU escrow fund itself 
since it is located in Canada.) When 
strikers are poor, such a court rule 
could have an even more serious 
effect. Poor tenants, constantly 
pressured by more immediate needs 
like food and clothing, are frequently 
unable to afford the full rent and, 
therefore, cannot regularly set aside 
this amount to cover some future 
court action. When they go to court 
and cannot produce all the back rent, 
they face summary judgment, even 
though the landlord may not 
ultimately be entitled to the rent. 
4. January, 1970-The single judge 
trying eviction cases began issuing 
summary judgments against tenants 
after landlords began suing only for 
possession rather than for both 
possession and back rent as before. 
According to newspapers in Ann 
Arbor, the judge reasoned as follows: 
if the landlord is seeking only 
possession, it is not within the province 
of the judge or jury to determine the 
exact amount of rent due but merely 
whether any rent is due. Since some 
rent is certainly due, possession is 
granted. 
This reasoning has the practical 
effect of saying that all the rent is due, 
for the tenant must then pay the full 
amount within ten days or be evicted. 
Such reasoning is an amazing 
demonstration of legal sophistry. By 
deciding this way, the judge has 
eliminated any chance for the tenant 
to make his case before a jury. This 
not only frustrates the intent of 
M.P.A. 297, but also greatly eases 
court congestion, thus undermining 
the cornerstone of the strike's legal 
strategy. The rent strike strategy 
depends on prolonged pressure on 
landlords. However, the experience in 
Ann Arbor suggests that the courts are 
reluctant to allow such attacks on the 
inequitable management of rental 
properties. It seems to be only a 
matter of time before the courts move 
in a direction favorable to landlords. 
Once this fact is recognized, energy 
can be directed toward the only 
available strategy; namely, prolonging 
that period of time. Legal tactics will 
be effective in the long run only 
within the framework of a more 
comprehensive strategy. The impact 
will largely depend on how much 
community support can be mobilized 
for the tenants' organization. If an 
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effective climate of support can be 
created, political pressures will be 
generated that may deter aggressive 
behavior by landlords and induce 
decisions by courts that will allow the 
battle to be fought on the economic 
level. 
In Ann Arbor, the AATU obtained 
the endorsement of the United Auto 
Workers International (nation-wide), 
the Michigan New Democratic 
Coalition, the Washington County 
Democratic Party, four members of 
the Ann Arbor City Council and the 
chairmen of the Ann Arbor Housing 
Commission and the Human Relations 
Commission. The AATU also picketed 
the homes of the more unpopular 
landlords (including the state crime 
commissioner) and organized marches 
on the business offices of several of 
the major landlords to demand 
recognition and negotiations. While it 
would be difficult to trace precisely 
the effects of this strategy on the 
decisions made by the landlords and 
the courts, there are strong indications 
that outside pressure played an 
important part in preventing the 
preliminary injunction against the 
AA TU in the conspiracy suit and the 
summary judgments in the eviction 
cases. It is no mere coincidence that 
the more recent court decisions that 
have hurt the strike came at a time 
when AATU activity was directed 
more toward building the organization 
internally than toward maintaining 
community support or carrying out 
militant activities. 
In the last analysis·, while it is true 
that a legal defense team must always 
be prepared to make the appropriate 
legal responses when defending 
tenants, their actions must be viewed 
in the context of a widespread 
political and organizational campaign. 
The use of the law alone will never 
bring justice if those who are enemies 
of the strike do not feel the pressure 
of a broadly based, well coordinated 
political movement. 
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